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3Introduction
Preface
France1 has always been an engine of European integration, especially
of its political aspects. It is also one of the most active actors in EU
politics and policies. France’s level of „europeanisation“2 of the national
foreign policy is of a high degree. France is considered a big proponent
of the EU Common foreign and Security policy (CFSP). However, it is
worth asking whether France really play role of the driving force behind
the evolution of CFSP.
The aim of the analysis is to identify whether and to what extent:
• France contributes to the successful and positive development of
CFSP
• France’s visions of CFSP correspond to those of other EU members
Justification
Firstly, France represents in this regard an obviously significant case of a
country, which links its foreign policy with European integration while
preserving its national exclusivity and large foreign policy engagement.
Secondly, the nature of the French foreign and security policy as a whole
requires an in-depth reasoning of its current state and circumstances
                                                          
1 Here at the beginning I would like to pay my sincere tribute to my tutors: Jan Eichler, PhD, Institute of
International Relations in Prague, and Michel Perottino, PhD, general secretary of CEFRES in Prague, who both
stimulated my ambition to do research on France and EU foreign and security policy.
2 Europeannisation is a relatively new academic term describing the process of the national adaptation to the
emerging EU level priorities in the foreign policy as the EU foreign policy itself has been evolving from the EPC
to CFSP.For such a definition, I am bound to my colleague and research fellow at EUROPEUM, publisher of
Integrace, Dimitris Kavakas who defined the term in his book Greece and Spain in European Foreign Policy,
Ashgate.
4under which it has been developing. Special focus should be dedicated
to the internal factors, not easily comprehensible at the first sight but
remarkably forming France’s behaviour in the global and European
arena.
Thirdly, the importance of France as an actor on the EU and even world-
wide level supposes that any effort aiming to understand the
fundamental French attitudes to the issues of the contemporary
European Union and international relations, and to assess probable
French strategies towards these issues, shall facilitate orientation in the
complicated and intricate European or global scene.
Definition and methodology
The topic is determined as description of the relation and/or interaction
between France and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the
European Union (CFSP) while understanding the former being the actor
– driving force – and the latter being the output.
The two essential terms are defined in the framework of two major levels:
extensive and restrictive. Both levels of the definition are used in the text.
They can be discerned according to the context.
The term France is defined:
• extensively - as a long-term mainstream
policy strategy of the country on the base
of the debate in the expert community
and following political actions3
• restrictively – as the action of the
President and the Government
The term Common Foreign and Security Policy is defined:
• extensively – as European aspiration to
become an important global player either
in co-operation with or in rivalry to the US
                                                          
3 In case of France, strong opinion cohesion between the foreign and security policy decision-makers and the
foreign and security policy expert community is present. The major opinion of the expert community always
prevails also in the official strategy of the country. It is given to the long tradition of relations between the
political scene and certain research institutes that are considered as official ones, although their products are not
influenced by the political power.
5• restrictively – as a concrete project with
particular and specific outputs, e.g. the
peace-keeping missions
In the report, a frequent reference to the term: “foreign and security
policy” can be found. The notion of the term consists of:
• strategy and means in external action
towards other internal law actors4
• strategy and means in the external
security5
The author aims to apply such methodology which would target a variety
of aspects of the selected topic. These are the basic categories into
which facts and conclusions are sorted:
? evolution: Cold War and post-Cold War eras’ foreign and security
policies
? unity and diversity of the French political scene regarding CFSP
? minimum and maximum country’s goals in CFSP
? means and instruments to be used in order to achieve these goals
? sustainability of the French goals and means and their
acceptability for other EU countries
Fundamental Assumptions
French foreign and security policy priorities
Since 1950s France has viewed the process of European integration as
an important means of promoting the country’s foreign policy objectives.6
                                                          
4 Restrictive definition: states and IGOs, extensive definition: states, nations, ethnical units, rebelliuos and
combatant parties, NGOs, movements etc.
5 External security means mainly defence related issues and military means: army, defence industry, strategic
conception, colations etc. Although it is closely with the internal security – battle against terrorism, crime, illegal
immigration etc. by non-military means – police, justice, administration.
6The evolution of CFSP7 has only underlined this attitude: France strives
for setting-up such CFSP’s goals that would respond to those of France.
 The general ones are8:
1. respect for human rights and democratic
principles9
2. respect for state sovereignty and
international law10
3. general war prevention
4. co-operation among states and nations
The more specifics goals (see below) do have in sight the strengthening
of France’s prestige through the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
The basic argument is: raise of Europe’s importance as an global actor
implies the raise of France’s importance.
French motivations
France aims at promoting creation of a “politically united Europe”. The
whole political scene is united over this point. It is because:
? France considers itself the most important political actor in the
European continent.
? Europe, from the French perspective, is the “immediate
environment” and a strictly determined entity
? France has never disassociated European integration from its
foreign policy priority n°1
? Europe is a means of retaining France's world-power status11
CFSP in the light of French interests
European integration became and still is the platform for the
implementation of the traditional12 French foreign policy. This is despite
the fact that the strategic milieu has fundamentally changed: while the
period of the Cold War with its division into two major blocks enabled
France to ensure the independence of the foreign and security policy, the
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 Guyomarch, A., Machin, H.: France in the European Union, St. Martin´s Press, New York, 2000, Chaptre:
France and CFSP
7 Through establishing the European Political Cooperation (EPC)
8 Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatie.gouv.fr
9 However, France is often critised for its deep relations with states who violate these principles
10 France neglects the fact that in many cases the two principles (1,2,3) have been in contradiction. e.g. Kosovo
Crisis
11 Represented particularly by French permanent membership in UNSC
12 I.e. the foreign policy of the Vth Republic: the conception conceived by its founder, Charles de Gaulle
7end of it brought about a decline in the importance of France in the
chessboard of international politics. Now that the preserving of the
foreign and security autonomy seems to be a hard deal for France,
facing the power of the US, Europe has commenced to play a key role in
the French effort to recover the “super-power status” and re-achieve the
“lost independence”. This effort is, however, well framed under “the
grand debate” on the emancipation of Europe, which gained piquancy
during the Iraq Crisis.
Under the discussion France started to argue that nature of security had
changed since the end of the Cold War which brought a change in the
American perception of Europe: according to France, Europe should
strive for independence from North America since it is not assured for the
future that any special relationship between Europe and the US will be
sustainable.
France is the main engine of the development of CFSP and the main
contributor to the fulfilment of its relatively limited goals. Any capable
common European foreign policy and security policy could not be borne
and work without French engagement. On the other hand, French
radicalism in the domain of European foreign policy and defence
activities (due to the internal politics) causes disunity rather than unity
amongst the members of the European Union, disregarding the damage
to the Transatlantic relations.
Summary of the evolution until present time
Cold War Era
Establishment of the Fifth Republic brought a grand change in French
foreign and security policy13. Setting the priorities appeared as the most
significant effect of this reversal, despite the fact that these priorities
underwent various revisions14. The priorities were:
? endeavour to preserve France as a world power (la Grandeur)
                                                          
13 This fundamental change was firstly cricised by Socialists in opposition. After their arrive to power (1981),
they however accepted them as thier own. This so-called „institutional and policy coherence was present in many
fields of French politics – and assured high unity of French political scene over foreign and security policy
issues.
14 The revision of the two governments lead by Jacques Chirac (1974 – 1976; 1986 – 1988) represented the most
important revisions in term of a partial return to the NATO military structures.
8? foreign and defence policy independence: autonomy of decisions
(quitting the NATO military structures)
? building of national nuclear weapons15  (force de frappe)
? emphasis on the inter-block diplomacy (politique de l´Est)
? large global engagement (tous azimuts)
? Europeanisation of the policy (l’Europe de l’Atlantique à l’Oural)
During the Cold War Era France played a role of a triple balance. Firstly,
balancing between two blocks, secondly balancing the influence of the
United States in Western Europe, thirdly, balancing between European
states. France, willing to reconcile with Germany, chose it as a strategic
partner in Europe. The Franco-German axis, even though undergoing
periods of variable intensity of co-ordination and co-operation, was
indisputably the very engine of European integration and emerging
common European foreign and security policy16, articulated by the
European Political Co-operation.
Post Cold War Era
The end of the Cold War brought about a decline in the importance of
France both at the global level and at the European level. Reunification
of Germany and the post-communist transition under American
supervision can be described as a failure of the long-term French
European policy17. France tried to avoid the decline of its importance in
the European field by development (Eurocorps) or initiation (Eurofor,
Euromarfor) of projects of military co-operation between some European
states in the framework of the Western European Union.
France18 decided to abandon the conception “Europe à la carte19 and
started to promote the vision of multi-speed Europe more compatible
with the then French interests. This vision was incorporated in the
initiation of:
? Monetary union (community method)
? Justice and Home Affairs (inter-governmental method)
? Common Foreign and Security Policy (inter-governmental method)
                                                          
15 The major goal of building the nuclear weapons was to abandon dependence of France on American nuclear
weapons and American decisions about their usage. France‘s strategy consists of deterioration of the potential
enemy. Today, France disposes with medium-range missiles carried by submarines and strategic bombardiers.
16 Franco-German brigade from 1989 initiated the creation of Eurocorps
17 E.g. failure of the Mitterrand´s project of creation of a European confederation
18 Still lead by Francois Mitterrand
19 European integration in many ways, set for everybody´s choice
9Striving for “more Europe” in foreign and security policy
The initiation period of the Common Foreign and Security Policy was not
at all a success. Just after having signed the Treaty of European Union
establishing the CFSP the EU states entered a complete disunion over
the war in Bosnia that buried every chance to stop war with European
means.
Such hard experience with its own disunion and incapability, notably
underlined by the fact that Americans came to save Europe “as usual”,
made European leaders seriously consider the project of CFSP as not
only an idealistic goal for the future, but as a real alternative. France
achieved what it wanted to achieve – political will at the European level
to build-up the common foreign and security policy.
While Germany primarily attracted by the EMU, the United Kingdom
should have been France’s major partner, for the first time in the
European integration’s history, at the construction of CFSP. It could only
happen after the arrival of Tony Blair to the 10 Downing Street. He
denied the actual British strategy to block any deepening of European
integration and approved20 the two first concrete steps forward in the
frame of CFSP:
• inclusion of the WEU under CFSP21
• European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP)22.
This era seemed to generate a very substantial progress in the foreign
and defence unification of the European Union.
The external reasons for that are:
• the will of the governing Labour Party to
revise traditional European Policy of
Great Britain23
• unity of Europe after the bad experience
with their disunion over the war in Bosnia
                                                          
20 Franco-British Summit in Saint-Malo, 1998
21 The Amsterdam Treaty
22 European Council Summits: Cologne, Feira, Helsinky
23 The revision concerned both UK traditional foreign policy and Labour Party´s traditional eurosceptical policy
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• the will of the Clinton administration to
co-operate with the European allies
including France
The internal French reasons for that are:
• the will of the Socialists as well as the
RPR24 to co-operate with the US and EU
members
• policy of the president Jacques Chirac
aiming at strengthening Atlanticism in the
French foreign and security policy25
• spirit of collaboration (from the First Gulf
War to the Kosovo Crisis)
• weakening of the Franco-German axis
Break in the new century
In fact, as late as the Bush administration had been set-up, the spirit of
comprehension and co-operation disappeared. This was largely due to
the controversy of the American “War against Terrorism” after the
September 11 attacks resulting into the Iraq Crisis.
At the beginning European states, including France, joined the anti-
terrorist coalition created by US. EU members took also several
measures in order to enhance the internal security. Nevertheless, the
American policy tending to justify all its unilateral attitudes as well as
military actions without UN mandate by the war against terrorism was not
finally accepted by certain European states, in particular by France,
Germany and Belgium. The fundamental split between US and these
states, as well as between Europeans themselves, appeared during the
Iraq crisis.
France attacked the American unilateralism derived from the new
American Strategic Conception, resumed by the US Secretary of
Defence, Donald Rumsfeld: that’s the mission which creates the
coalition, not the coalition that creates the mission. France, however,
argues that the principles of the American Strategic Conception were not
invented by the current administration but represent an American long-
term strategy, firstly applied by the Clinton administration26 in the case of
                                                          
24 Rassemblement pour la République – main right wing party
25 Chirac even strove for return to the NATO military structures by 2000
26 Vedrine, Hubert, Face à l‘hyperpuissance, Fayard, 2003
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the operations Desert Fox in 2002, with the goals as the operation Iraqi
Freedom in 2003, and Allied Force in Kosovo – both of them clearly
beyond the framework of United Nations27. Additionally to that, France
does not judge September 11 a fundamental change in American
policy.28
As conclusion of the stated above, France found unacceptable the
doctrine of the pre-emptive war29 and bypassing of the UN30.
Hence, France is afraid of:
? degradation of the post-WW2 concept of international law,
represented by the UN, and in particular the UN Security Council,
and consequently the degradation of its position as a permanent
member
? fall of the ESDP project, originally born as complementary to the
US foreign and security policy, now rather in conflict with it.
France’s reaction to the crucial changes in international relations can be
characterised as strategy towards:
? promotion of the respect for the key-role of United Nations in
international security
? promotion of the principle of enhanced co-operation in the matter
of the foreign and security policy (Gang of Four31)
? promotion of the co-operation with Schröder’s Germany
? promotion of the creation of an independent and alternative EU
strategic conception, different from that of the USA
? promotion of the idea of permanent chairman of the European
Council and European Foreign Minister for more continuity in
external action of the Union32
? efforts at acceleration of building Defence Union inside the EU on
the basis of enhanced/structured co-operation
? efforts at exclusion of UK from CFSP decision-making core
? efforts at rapid launching of the EU military missions
                                                          
27 Thierry de Montbrial, director of the French Institute of International Relations in Paris speaks about total
bypassing of UN by Americans: „After September 11 they could get green light in UNSC for attacking Talibans.
In spite of that, they started the war without the UNSC mandate because they did not consider it necessary.“,
Perspectives 2003, RAMSES, 2003, IFRI
28 Boniface, Pascal, La France contre l‘empire, Seuil, 2003
29 Despite the fact that France is the inventor of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
30 France´s position as a global power is dependant on respecting UN and its security mechanism (UNSC)
31 France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg
32 Many of French statements and priorities ragarding CFSP future development were formulated under the
discussion about future of Europe at the Convention
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? efforts at building the deployable European military capacities33
? efforts at building quality and profitable armament industry34
France however did not meet clear and unique acceptance of its visions,
except for the idea of permanent chairman of the European Council and
European Foreign Minister, and was rather rejected by majority (outside
Gang of Four) of EU member states. The dissension between the
member states regarding the EU foreign and security policy future shape
commenced in association with the controversial French Presidency of
the European Union in the second half of 2000, culminating at the
Summit of Nice35 where France neither succeeded as a roofing leader,
nor proved its ability to persuade other states of its visions. The big
disunion continued until the Iraq Crisis during which the positions of EU
states became without precedence extraordinarily sharp.
France contributed to the disarray of the Transatlantic tie and to division
of European states in two camps36, even not without mutual blaming37.
“The Grand Debate” on Europe’s emancipation began again. It is even
incredible that first EU operations38 were launched in this atmosphere.
What kind of CFSP?
Multifunctionality
France has always been in favour of a pro-active and influential CFSP in
order to make EU an influential global player. The imperative basis is the
frame and mandate of United Nations, rules of collective defence and
large-scale and multilateral diplomacy. Critiques of France’s approach
argue that France itself rejects any other’s involvement in the area which
France understands an exclusive sphere of its interest39.
                                                          
33 Operationability of forces: planning capacities, mobility capacities (Airbus A400M), navigation (HELIOS)
and armament capacities (EUROFIGHTER)
34 EADS – European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (France, Germany, Spain)
35 Summit of Nice was negatively remarked especially with dispute between the president Chirac and prime-
minister Jospin
36 Named as „New Europe“ and „Old Europe“
37 E.g. the blaming by Jacques Chirac on the candidate countries for their pro-American positions during the
„Irak“ Brussels summit in the spring 2003: „They missed the occasion to stay silent.“
38 EU Police Mission in Bosnia, Operation „Concordia“ in FYROM and „Artemis“ in the Congo
39 E.g. French Africa
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As to CFSP’s ability, the European Union is, according to France, able to
offer variety of “services”40 (unlike NATO – a priori military organisation),
the military means only in the last resort41. In addition to it, EU is more
acceptable than the US for many nations. The EU’s capacity in French
view rests upon:
1. diplomacy
2. peace-forcing and peace-keeping
3. police, administrative and judicial
assistance
4. development and humanitarian aid
Globalisation of CFSP: EU as a global actor
From the geographical point of view, France advances these possible
priorities:
? Magreb, North Africa and the Balkans42 (development of the
association and co-operation43)
? Sub-Saharan Africa and APC44 (assistance, aid, peace-enforcing,
peace-keeping)45
? Middle East (diplomacy, co-operation)46
? Far East (diplomacy, co-operation)
France prefers building good relations and co-operation with:
• permanent UNSC members and G8
countries
• key-African states (RSA, Nigeria,)
• key Middle East states (Syria, Jordan,
Egypt)
• key Far East states (Korea, Vietnam)
                                                          
40 „The means agianst terrorism is not only war, but also development and economical co-operation “, Jacques
Chirac´s address, 2000
41 On the other hand, as to the ESDP, France denies the reduction of the ESDP goals to the so-called Petersberg
Tasks – originally WEU goals integrated into CFSP – emphasizing peace-keeping missions
42 Stabilisation of the Mediterranean region – threat of immigration from Africa
43 MEDA Programme, Barcelona Process
44 African, Pacific and Carribean Countries: Lomé, Cotonou EU-APC Conventions on co-operation and
assistance
45 France is able to offer its large extend experience given its traditional engagement in the sub-Saharan region
46 Recently, not only France, but most EU members are worried over the Bush administration activity in the
Peace Process, especially regarding the American support to the Israeli effort to accuse Jasir Arafat of being the
obstacle to peace. France also proposed deployment of EU peace-keeping forces in the Palestinian territory.
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on the basis of promotion of:
• economic and development co-operation
• cultural, scientific and technical co-
operation
• political and military co-operation
• conflict resolution
• diplomatic solutions of crisis
and on the basis of fight against:
• poverty, illiteracy and social disparities
• cultural and religious clashes
• WMD proliferation and terrorism47
• local conflicts
• sudden international crises
French recommendations to the powerless and toothless Union
France is the principle partisan of the raise of capacities of the European
Union in foreign affairs and defence, while neglecting the fact that the
very lack of these comes with in the non-existence of a single strategic
concept48. Any such concept must no longer be a mere enumeration of
the current issues/crises and tooth-less declarations adopted with regard
to these issues/crises. EU misses a credible and long-term strategic
concept: it would be nevertheless hard to adopt such a concept when
there few common interests and positions amongst Europeans.
Any CFSP, even functional one is unacceptable for France at the cost of
being reduced to a sort of compromise49. Nevertheless, French
president, government, thin-tanks and other policy actors do their best to
convince European allies about the necessity of:
• assuring the function of CFSP
structures50 in the framework of the
Council
                                                          
47 And other contemporary security threats: human, drug and weapon traffic, enviromental and Internet security
threats, etc.
48 A certain progress in this regard was made at the Thessaloniki summit in June 2003 where the European
Council adopted a strategic concept presented by Javier Solana. This strategy nevertheless does not abandon the
general level.
49 Limited goals and means establishing no rivality to United States and NATO
50 Foreign minister, PSC, EUMC, EUMS, OCCAR, COREU, ECHO
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• giving more instruments to EU: positive
and negative sanctions, diplomatic
service, the most efficient51 humanitarian
& development aid in the world
• unity above the exercising of decisions
already adopted
• successful results of the peace-keeping
missions52
• improvement of the military
operationability53
• raise of military and R&D budgets
• promotion the European military
industry54
What did France do to “improve” the situation?
France is well aware of the deficiencies of EU in the area of foreign and
security policy. France itself has made a considerable progress in this
regard. France decided to:
• transmit the foreign and security policy (in
determined areas) decision-making onto
the European level, i.e. CFSP structures
• respect the common decisions and
declarations
• become the “framework nation” of the EU
peace-missions55
• offer its military and planning capacities
to the European Union56
                                                          
51 In matters of quality and quantity
52 When EU will take NATO peace-keeping in Bosnia in mid-2004, then it will be tremendously challenged
53 France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemourg proposed in April 2003 the creation of a core of collective
planning and operational capabilities: European military command headquarters in Tervuren , Belgium = for the
EU without using NATO assets and capabilities. France also proposed at the beginning of the IGC in Rome in
October 2003 that EU create its own paramilitary ‚gendarme‘ force to help create stability after military
peacekeeping missions.
54 At the EU summit in Thessaloniki EU leaders agreed to set up a defence agency, during the course of 2004, in
the field of "defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments." This agreement responds to
the statement in the EU constitutional draft. France was the main militant of this idea.
55 EU Police Mission in Bosnia – 58 policemen out of 500, Concordia (FYROM) – 197 out of 400 members of
the Staff and French commander (gen. Maral), ARTEMIS (Congo) 1200 soldiers out of 1400 and French
commander (gen. Thonier); source: French Ministry of Defence, defense.gouv.fr
56 Centre National de Ciblage, Helios – navigation, 12.000 GI to the Rapid Reaction Forces (one fourth), weapon
systems: TIGER, COBRA, METEOR, MIRAGE, etc.
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• increase the humanitarian aid
expenditures up to 17,5%57 of the whole
EU’s expenditures
• sustain the military expenditure at 2,5%58
of GDP59 and raise of the R&D budget up
to 2,18%60 of GDP61 despite the EU
economic recession
• promote merger of Thales62 into EADS63
in order to connect the electronic systems
technology with the weapon systems
producer64 to face Boeing and Lockheed
Martin.
• promote co-operation between EADS
and BAE Systems65
Conclusions
What has been treated in this paper is an overall description of the
priorities of France related to the shaping the Common Foreign and
Security Policy in the context of the current development in international
and European politics. Now we will let us try to evaluate these priorities
also in the mentioned context. The principal focal points of this
evaluation are:
1. Coherence of France’s strategy
2. Extent of acceptability of France’s visions
of CFSP for other EU states
1. Coherence of France’s strategy
France’s endeavour to build-up an efficient, operational and respectable
EU foreign and security policy is complex and coherent due to the
                                                          
57 Source: Embassy of France in the USA
58 USA – 3,1% of GDP, UK – 2,5% of GDP
59 After a decade of decrease from 3,5 % in 1990 down to 2,4 % in 1996, source: Human Development Report,
UN Development Programme
60 USA – 2,6% of GDP, UK – 1,83% GDP
61 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics
62 Despite the fact that Thales´s future lies on Pentagon contracts
63 „Airbus and A400M company“: merger of the French Matra and German DASA
64 Similarly to the merger of GEC-Marconi into British Aerospace (BAE Systems)
65 Following the example of the EUROFIGHTER
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traditional unity of its political scene over this topic. On the other hand,
the extent of this endeavour, its intensity and energy devoted to it rather
gathers the camp of France’s opponents.
? France is not willing to search for a compromise in matters of
CFSP and ESDP, which – owing to the diversity of positions – is
necessary and in fact inevitable.
? France criticises others for neither willing to nor letting their
interests converge towards a EU common interests, defined with a
high extent of variability, while France itself hardly conforms to this
common interest.66
? France promotes an efficiently functioning CFSP. France, however,
refuses the use of community method in this domain and insists on
the inter-governmental method with implication of right of veto.
? France advances the idea of a strong and capable Europe – only
heading the foreign policy and military emancipation from the US
and weakening of the role of the US in Europe and in the world.
2. Extent of acceptability of France’s visions of CFSP for other EU
states
French visions, illustrated by such an interpretation as above, are not
admissible for other European states, both EU members and the
candidate countries, possibly except for Greece, Belgium and to a
certain extent, Germany67. The upcoming enlargement of EU by 10 new
countries will only strengthen the camp of opponents of France’s CFSP
concept.
Any real CFSP, i.e. functioning and acceptable for the whole EU in
respect of its goals could be established unless the following French
perceptions are abandoned:
• enhanced co-operation in external action
and defence – creation of a hard core
inside the EU68
• EU foreign and security strategic concept
drawn as opposite to that of the USA69
                                                          
66 In case EU tends to criticise or condemn states belonging to the sphere of French interest, mostly in Africa
67 For the current government; not for CDU/CSU
68 Especially without the United Kingdom
69 Particularly so-called Non-EU Eurpean Allies (NEEA) – non EU European NATO members are hereby
worried
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• enlarging the missions of ESDP beyond
the Petersberg Tasks and heading a
defence union challenging NATO70
France is on the one hand the real driving-force behind CFSP but on the
other too much eager one. France then could become paradoxically its
gravedigger.
Final recommendations
Although many of the French ideas and attitudes regarding CFSP are full
controversy (see above), many of them are relatively appealing to the
France’s EU counterparts71, particularly:
• multilateralism in global governance
• large-scale security (aid, co-operation
and assistance)
• emphasis on peaceful and diplomatic
solutions of crises, if possible
• high number of peace-enforcing and
peace–keeping missions
• improvement of Europe’s foreign policy
unity
• improvement of Europe’s military
capacity72
The main conclusion of this analysis is that a substantial and realistic
revision of French dogmatic positions in order to abate them will bring
more consensus to Europe as to CFSP goals and will make the
fundamental ideas of CFSP shareable for a majority, if not all EU
countries. Additionally, it will weaken the partisans of unilateralism and
“bushism” in Europe and would ensure a solid political base for a well-
functioning and efficient EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.
                                                          
70 The most unacceptable point is duplicating of military and planning capacities (NATO-EU) which would be
burden for EU countries’ deficit budgets and duplicating of NATO´s monopoly in the collective defence. UK,
Spain, Italy and Portugal in this regard push an idea – an alternative to EU defence autonomy of the “Gang of
Four” of involving EU military capabilities under wings of NATO so that EU become one cell of NATO, with
its particular command in Mons under SHAPE. This plan is called “Food for Thought”.
71 They are acceptable, therefore they could have appeared in the EU Constitutional Draft from the Convention
72 In the frame of existing European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)
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